A simple schema of anaesthesia system error evolution is described. This was used. with a modified critical incident technique, as a framework for data gathering and error analysis. The outline places emphasis on recovery pathways and. in addition to causal and contributory factors. was able to identify many factors which aided or hindered the processes of error detection. diagnosis and management. On average. 8.1 factors were identified which were considered to have significantly influenced the genesis and evolution of each reported error. Differences were apparent in the type of factors which determined error production and aspects of the recovery sequence. The described schema is suggested to be of value for data generation. and as a tool for discussion as part of anaesthesia quality assurance.
Since the application of a modified critical incident technique to anaesthesia by Cooper et al. . several published surveys have examined the cause of system error or 'near miss' incidents. [1] [2] [3] [4] Although the emphasis in these papers has been towards descriptive taxonomy and the identification of causal factors, the critical incident technique has been suggested to be of value within hospital anaesthesia departments as a method of ongoing quality assurance to improve patient safety. The reliability of the technique has been validated and it has been widely applied in less modified form in other areas of medicine and medical education. [5] [6] [7] In order to gather detailed data for discussion and analysis however, a framework of mishap or system error evolution is desirable with which to structure one's questions and thoughts around otherwise highly complex events.
In this study we attempted to define the evolutionary structure of a system error with particular emphasis placed on recovery pathways and then to use this, with the critical incident technique, to examine system errors within our own hospital.
METHODS
For the purposes of our study, we have attempted to use a 'systems' view of errorS-1 2 where the system under scrutiny incorporates the entire anaesthesia management process. We define an anaesthesia system error as 'inappropriate or undesirable human or equipment performance which was unanticipated and which reduced, or had the potential for reducing, effectiveness, safety or system performance.' This definition is based partly on that of Cooper2 together with the broader definition of human error by Sanders and McCormick ll . The term system failure we use to describe those incidents where the intended output of the system was not achieved, i.e. those that resulted in a 'substantive negative outcome' or patient morbidity.** We suggest that the natural sequence of events for a simple systems error is as follows ( Figure 1 ). One or more errors l interact in some fashion and lead to an unstable condition from which a pathophysiological sequence begins to develop. For the sake of this discussion we have called this unstable condition the critical state. 2 Just as a critical mass of radioactive material is required to start a nuclear chain reaction, from a pre-existing physiological condition, the critical state results in the development of one or more pathophysiological changes. 3 The system error may be detected 4 at either steps 1, 2 or 3 and, following detection, a diagnosis 5 or diagnoses are made. Action 6 is then taken to either confirm the diagnosis, correct the critical state or correct the pathophysiological changes. The initial **Footnote: Another term, system accident has been coined by Perrow to describe 'the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures' where the failure is the direct result of the design of the system itself. 10 Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vo/. 19, No. 1, February, 1991 response 7 to therapy and the subsequent final outcome 8 (either return to the pre-existing state or morbidity) will be determined by the speed with which the pathophysiological processes can be corrected and the characteristics and rate of the pathophysiological sequence itself.
Each of these stages evolves in time, with both positive and negative factors influencing the rate with which each step in the process occurs (letters a-h in Figure I ). These rate determining factors will be of crucial importance to the final outcome.
As an example of this evolution, we might consider a common event such as circuit disconnection. If additional events are also present, such as the patient being paralysed with neuromuscular blocking agents, then an unstable critical state of apnoea will occur (step a) and complex pathophysiological sequences will develop with hypoxaemia and hypercarbia. The speed with which hypoxaemia occurs (step b) may be hastened by a pre-existing reduction in FRC or slowed by the patient breathing high F102 gas mixtures prior to the disconnect. The speed with which the hypoxaemia leads to a permanent injury (step c) might be enhanced by pre-existing cerebro-or cardiovascular disease. The detection of the hypoxaemia (step d) might be slowed by the anaesthetist being engaged in teaching activities and having turned off the oxygen saturation monitor alarm, but hastened by the presence of an anaesthesia technician who notices the oxygen saturation reading. The ability of the anaesthetist to diagnose (step e) the cause of the low oxygen saturation may be hampered by surgical draping over the disconnection site, and his ability to take corrective or palliative action (step f) may be made more difficult during a neurosurgical procedure because of access problems. Other factors such as pre-existing pulmonary disease may then influence the ability of this corrective action to have an immediate desired effect in correcting the arterial blood gas tensions (step g) and additional patient disease may influence whether this correction is adequate to result in a return to the pre-existing physiological condition or to result in morbidity (step h). From this basic framework of system error evolution, a three-page data collection form was devised with questions on the demographic features of each incident, the recalled sequence of events and the negative as well as positive factors which influenced the processes of pathophysiological evolution, event detection, diagnosis, action and recovery.
Prior to its introduction, a departmental meeting was held at which the aims of the scheme and the method of data completion were outlined. Report forms were placed in all anaesthetising locations and an anaesthetist visited each operating theatre daily, gathering completed data forms, clarifying unclear entries where necessary and reminding anaethetists of the study. If an anaesthetist wished to remain anonymous, reports were mailed directly to the authors and no further action taken. The data from completed forms was entered onto a microcomputer data base application. This present paper describes a summary of basic findings relevant to the method itself and a more detailed statistical analysis ofthe system error evolution will be presented elsewhere.
RESULTS
Over a three-month period, 3546 operations were performed and data from one hundred events were received (2.8%). Similar to previous studies, the most frequently reported incidents were those related to gas delivery, drug administration, the airway and ventilation.
All reported events could be structured according to the described evolutionary flowchart although some actually involved errors within the processes of detection, diagnosis and corrective action from some other system error.
From the 100 cases, 319 factors were identified which were considered to have caused or contributed to the production of the critical state. As in other published studies, human factors were most frequently implicated as the primary cause and the most frequent causal individual is the anaesthetist. However, differences were found between causal and contributory factors. Contributory factors were proportionately less frequently humanor equipment-related and more frequently related to organisation, technical factors or patient-related. (We define technical factors here as those which are an undesirable, though accepted or necessary part of the anaesthetic/surgical procedure, e.g. covering the airway during neurosurgical procedures, shared airway One hundred and nineteen factors were considered to have significantly influenced the speed with which the resulting pathophysiological sequence developed. One hundred and sixty-one factors influenced the process of detection, 70 influenced the ability of the anaesthetist to diagnose the cause of the detected problem and I 04 influenced his/her ability to take immediate corrective action (Table I) . On average, 8.1 factors were considered to be significant in the genesis and evolution of each event.
The majority of causal, contributory or recovery factors were simple and well documented aspects of anaesthesia. When grouped together, the most frequently reported factors to influence the production of a system error and its recovery were: (+ denotes a positive, helpful factor and -a negative undesirable factor); assistance ( + ), good monitoring (+), sound production and its perception (+), patient access (+), unimpeded visibility ( + ), confusing physiological signs ( -), immediate availability of drugs and basic equipment ( + ), inattention ( -) and the use of a muscle relaxant ( -).
In comparison with causation, anaesthetistrelated factors were less frequently described as being important in determining the three aspects of the recovery sequence. In contrast to cause where approximately half of causal factors were anaesthetist-related, and to contribution where one-third were anaesthetist-related, the anaesthetist was cited in one-fifth of detection, onethird of diagnostic and one-fifth of action-related factors.
The total numbers offactors aiding versus factors hindering the three stages of the recovery pathway were different. The ratio of the number of identified aiding versus hindering factors for detection was 1.4: I, for diagnosis 0.9: 1 and action was 0.9: 1. Thus, aids predominated for detection, but hindrances predominated for diagnosis and action.
An undesirable outcome or system failure occurred in thirteen cases. In 48, the event evolution was halted at the critical state (i.e. before any ensuing physiological changes were apparent), in 38 during subsequent physiological changes and in one case the treatment for the event caused morbidity. Undesirable outcomes included increased patient anxiety, awareness, delayed recovery, lip injury, tracheostomy, pneumothorax, gastric aspiration, angina, prolonged anaesthesia and painful surgery under local anaesthesia.
Following assessment of the reported critical incidents, the authors made available, written summaries of each event. The reports were discussed at monthly departmental quality assurance meetings. A total of 172 recommendations for avoidance were made from the 100 incidents and, in many cases these recommendations were made more than once. In retrospect, 25% of our recommendations were based on primary cause, 47% were based on contributory causes and 28% were based on the factors which modified detection, diagnosis or action. Twelve specific items of equipment were modified or taken out of service as a result of the reports and in five instances changes were made to the housing or labelling of drugs. 
DISCUSSION
Several published studies have used the techniques of critical incident analysis to examine system errors in anaesthesia. These have identified and classified preventable anaesthesia mishaps and have attempted to develop strategies for their avoidance. 2 -4 The technique has also been used to examine the effectiveness of anaesthesia monitoring systems. l3 . l4 These various studies indicate that the most common incidents arise from human error and frequently involve problems with breathing circuits, drug-syringe swaps, and problems with flowmeter controls and endotracheal tubesY-l7
In establishing an incident monitoring programme at our own hospital, it was readily apparent that system errors were often complex, and that no simple schema was available to help us organise our thoughts in order to analyse and gather detailed data on their characteristics. In presenting data on system errors obtained using the critical incident technique, Cooper et at. have noted the presence of 'associated factors' that ' ... conceivably could have contributed to the occurrence of an error, or to a failure to promptly detect an error'. 4 Williamson has also noted 'recurring influences that had a protective or positive effect, thus leading to an earlier correction of the error'. 3 Since after any significant error the recovery pathway will be of crucial importance to the eventual outcome, it seemed appropriate that any schema should include aspects of recovery from, as well as events leading to the undesirable incident. At Chernobyl, the disabling of recovery pathways contributed to disaster, and at Three Mile Island it was the difficulties of diagnosis and action that gave the biggest problems. s . ls Gaba et al. 9 have taken the 'normal accidents' or 'system accidents' model of Perrow lO to enlarge upon error recovery pathways after anaesthesia mishaps. The term 'coupling' is used to describe the interaction between separate items within a system where 'tight coupling describes systems in which there is no slack, buffer, or give between two items'. Coupling is important in determining the speed with which a system error evolves in time. In our described schema, we have attempted to incorporate these ideas of recovery pathway into a simple flow diagram. Coupling is seen in those factors which enhance or hinder the development of, for example, the pathophysiological sequence. Tighter coupling was observed with the use of neuromuscular blocking drugs, the presence of cardiorespiratory disease, certain types of surgical procedure and from the effect of the general anaesthetic agents. Looser coupling was observed with the use of high concentrations of oxygen and 
PREVENTATIVE FACTORS
Had any action been taken, or any equipment been used, that was intended to prevent this type of event occurring but which failed to do so. air mixtures, preoxygenation and spontaneous breathing techniques.
The basic framework presented here represents a very schematic view of what are often highly complicated events. In reality, multiple critical states mav coexist (or 'common mode failure')'
Several findings from this preliminary analysis are worthy of comment. We observed that although the anaesthetist is clearly important as the major causal factor in the production of error, other contributory factors of greater importance include organisation, technical factors and the patient. Thus any analysis which focuses on cause rather than contribution will emphasise the part played by Having detected that an unanticipated event was in progress, list (in order) all subsequent steps you took. Include diagnostic measures, as well as temporary and definitive corrective measures.
What recommendations do you have for preventing this event occurring again, or to improve the speed of its detection, diagnosis or correction (Continue on a separate sheet if neccessary). the anaesthetist and de-emphasise the role of administration and clinical difficulties. The recovery pathways were also less frequently influenced by factors related directly to the anaesthetist but by many factors which are related to the operating theatre environment; in particular, assistance, clear unimpeded visibility and access, a quiet environment; and the immediate availabity of drugs and basic equipment. Also, while aiding factors predominated for the process of detection, hindrances were predominant for subsequent action. Management might therefore be an important area of potential improvement.
Using the described flow diagram, we were impressed by the number of relevant factors which could be extracted from 'trivial' errors which in themselves were of little consequence. Although it is frequent at departmental morbidity and mortality sessions to focus upon major morbidity or mortality for discussion, it was our impression that frequently there were as many lessons to be learnt from simple errors and often they were the same as those that are relevant to major morbidity.
Since beginning this study we have found the described approach to system error analysis useful in data gathering and in providing anaesthetists with a framework with which to analyse untoward events and actions. By using such a scheme the anaesthetist is encouraged to look critically and reveal factors which he/she takes for granted as normal parts of the working environment. The method has proved valuable as a sequence for discussion at departmental clinical review meetings where many aspects of a seemingly simple event could be explored and discussed fully.
